Online reviews could, in principle, greatly improve the match between consumers and products.
Introduction
User-generated online reviews have become an important resource for consumers making purchase decisions; an extensive and growing literature documents the inuence of online user reviews on the quantity and price of transactions.
1 In theory, online reviews should create producer and consumer surplus by improving the quality of the match between consumers and products. However, one important impediment to the improvement in match quality is the possible existence of fake or promotional online reviews. Specically, reviewers with a material interest in the consumer's purchase decision may post reviews that are designed to inuence consumers and to resemble the reviews of disinterested consumers. While there is a substantial economic literature on persuasion and advertising (reviewed below), the specic context of advertising disguised as user reviews has not been extensively studied.
The presence of undetectable (or dicult to detect) fake reviews may have at least two deleterious eects on consumer and producer surplus. First, consumers who are fooled by the promotional reviews may make suboptimal choices. Second, the potential presence of biased reviews may lead consumers to mistrust reviews. This in turn forces consumers to disregard or underweight helpful information posted by disinterested reviewers. For these reasons, the Federal Trade Commission in the United States recently updated its guidelines governing endorsements and testimonials to also include online reviews. According to the guidelines, a user must disclose the existence of any material connection between himself and the manufacturer.
2 Relatedly, in February 2012, the UK Advertising Standards Authority ruled that TripAdvisor must not claim that it oers honest, real, or trusted reviews from real travelers. The Advertising Standards Authority, in its decision, held that TripAdvisor's claims implied that consumers could be assured that all review content on the TripAdvisor site was genuine, and when we understood that might not be the case, we concluded that the claims were misleading. 3
In order to examine the potential importance of these issues, we undertake an empirical analysis of the extent to which promotional reviewing activity occurs, and the rm characteristics and market conditions that result in an increase or decrease in promotional reviewing activity. The rst challenge to any such exercise is that detecting promotional reviews is dicult. After all, promotional reviews are designed to mimic unbiased reviews. For example, inferring that a review is fake because it conveys an extreme opinion is awed; presumably, individuals who had an extremely positive or negative experience with a product may be particularly inclined to post reviews. In this paper, we do not attempt to classify whether any particular review is fake, and instead we empirically exploit a key dierence in website business models. In particular, some websites accept reviews from anyone who chooses to post a review while other websites only allow reviews to be posted by consumers who have actually purchased a product through the website (or treat unveried reviews dierently from those posted by veried buyers). If posting a review requires making an actual purchase, the cost of posting disingenuous reviews is greatly increased. We examine dierences in the distribution of reviews for a given product between websites where faking is dicult and websites where faking is relatively easy.
Specically, in this paper we examine hotel reviews, exploiting the organizational dierences between Expedia.com, and Tripadvisor.com. Tripadvisor is a popular website that collects and publishes consumer reviews of hotels, restaurants, attractions and other travel-related services.
Anyone can post a review on Tripadvisor. Expedia.com is a website through which travel is booked; consumers are also encouraged to post reviews on the site, but a consumer can only post a review if she actually booked at least one night at the hotel through the website in the six months prior to the review post. Thus, the cost of posting a fake review on Expedia.com is quite high relative to the cost of posting a fake review on Tripadvisor. Further, since the reviewer had to undertake a credit card transaction on Expedia.com, the reviewer is not anonymous to the website host and thus, the potential for detection might also be higher. 4 We also explore the robustness of our results using data from Orbitz.com, where reviews can be either veried or unveried.
We present a simple analytical model in the Appendix that examines the equilibrium levels of manipulation of two horizontally-dierentiated competitors who are trying to convince a consumer to purchase their product. The model demonstrates that the cost of review manipulation (which 4 As discussed above, Tripadvisor has been criticized for not managing the fraudulent reviewing problem. Tripadvisor recently announced the appointment of a new Director of Content Integrity. Even in the presence of substantial content verication activity on Tripadvisor's part, our study design takes as a starting point the potential for fraud in Tripadvisor's business model relative to Expedia. we relate to reputational risk) determines the amount of manipulation in equilibrium. We marry the insights from this model to the literature on organizational form and organizational incentive structures. Based on the model as well as on the previous literature we examine the following hypotheses: 1) independent hotels are more likely to engage in review manipulation (post more fake positive reviews for themselves and more fake negative reviews for their competitors) than branded chain hotels, 2) small owners are more likely to engage in review manipulation than large owner hotels, and 3) hotels with a small management company are more likely to engage in review manipulation than hotels that use a large management company.
Our main empirical analysis is akin to a dierences in dierences approach (although, unconven- tionally, neither of the dierences is in the time dimension). Specically, we examine dierences in the reviews posted at Tripadvisor and Expedia for dierent types of hotels. For example, consider calculating for each hotel at each website the ratio of ve star (the highest) reviews to total reviews. We ask whether the dierence in this ratio for Tripadvisor vs. Expedia is higher for independent vs. branded chain hotels, whether the dierence is higher for hotels that are owned by large owners vs. small owners, and whether the dierence is higher for hotels that use large management companies vs. small management companies. Either dierence alone would be problematic. Tripadvisor and Expedia reviews could dier due to diering populations at the site. Independent versus chain hotels could have dierent distributions of true quality, for example. However, our approach isolates whether the two hotel types' reviewing patterns are signicantly dierent across the two sites. Similarly, we examine the ratio of one star and one and two star (the lowest) reviews to total reviews for hotels that are close geographic neighbors of independent vs. chain hotels, hotels with small owners vs. large owners, and hotels with large management companies versus small management companies. That is, we measure whether the neighbor of independent hotels fare worse on Tripadvisor than on Expedia, for example.
The results are largely consistent with our hypotheses. That is, we nd that hotel characteristics (such as ownership, aliation and management structure) aect the measure of review manipulation. We nd that there is relatively more positive manipulation than negative manipulation, even though the order of magnitude of the two is similar. We also nd that the total measured review manipulation, while economically signicant, is relatively modest: we estimate that an independent hotel owned by a small owner will generate 7 more fake positive reviews (out of 120). We also nd that a hotel that is located next to an independent hotel owned by a small owner will have 5 more fake negative reviews compared to an isolated hotel.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the prior literature. In Section 3 we describe the data and present summary statistics. In Section 4 we discuss the theoretical relationship between ownership structure and the incentive to manipulate reviews. In Section 5 we present our methodology and results, which includes main results as well as robustness checks. In Section 6 we conclude and also discuss limitations of the paper.
2
Prior Literature Broadly speaking, our paper is informed by the literature on rm's strategic communication, which includes research on advertising and persuasion. In advertising models the sender is the rm, and the receiver is the consumer who tries to learn about the product's quality before making a purchase decision. In these models the rm signals the quality of its product through the amount of resources invested into advertising (see Nelson (1974) , Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) , Bagwell and Ramey (1994) , Horstmann and Moorthy (2003) ) or the advertising content (Anand and Shachar (2009) , Anderson and Renault (2006) , Mayzlin and Shin (2011) ). In models of persuasion, the receiver can inuence the receiver's decision by optimally choosing the information structure (Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) show this in the case where the sender has private information, while Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show this result in the case of symmetric information). One common thread between all these papers is that the sender's identity and incentives are common-knowledge. That is, the receiver knows that the message is coming from a biased party, and hence is able to to take that into account when making her decision. In contrast, in our paper there is uncertainty surrounding the sender's true identity and incentives. That is, the consumer who reads a user review on Tripadvisor does not know if the review was written by an unbiased customer or by a biased source.
The models that are most closely related to the current research are Mayzlin (2006) and Dellarocas (2006) . Mayzlin (2006) presents a model of promotional chat where competing rms, as well as unbiased informed consumers, post messages about product quality online. Consumers are not able to distinguish between unbiased and biased word of mouth, and try to infer product quality based on online word of mouth. Mayzlin (2006) derives conditions under which online reviews are persuasive in equilibrium: online word of mouth inuences consumer choice. She also demonstrates that producers of lower quality products will expend more resources on promotional reviews. Compared to a system with no rm manipulation, promotional chat results in welfare loss due to distortions in consumer choices that arise due to manipulation. The welfare loss from promotional chat is lower the higher the participation by unbiased consumers in online fora. Dellarocas (2006) also examines the same issue. He nds that there exists an equilibrium where the high quality product invests more resources into review manipulation, which implies that promotional chat results in welfare increase for the consumer. Dellarocas (2006) additionally notes that the social cost of online manipulation can be reduced by developing technologies that increase the unit cost of manipulation and that encourage higher participation of honest consumers.
The potential for biased reviews aecting consumer responses to user reviews has been recognized in the popular press. Perhaps the most intuitive form of biased review is the situation in which a producer posts positive reviews for its own product. In a well-documented incident, in February 2004, an error at Amazon.com's Canadian site caused Amazon to mistakenly reveal book reviewer identities. It was apparent that a number of these reviews were written by the books' own publishers and authors (see Harmon (2004) ).
5 Other forms of biased reviews are also possible. For example, rival rms may benet from posting negative reviews of each other's products. In assessing the potential reward for such activity, it is important to assess whether products are indeed sucient substitutes to benet from negative reviewing activity. For example, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) argue that two books on the same subject may well be complements, rather than substitutes, and thus, it is not at all clear that disingenuous negative reviews for other rm's products would be helpful in the book market. Consistent with this argument, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) nd that consumer purchasing behavior responds less intensively to positive reviews (which consumers may estimate are frequently fake) than to negative reviews (which consumers may assess to be more frequently unbiased). However, there are certainly other situations in which two products are obviously substitutes; for example, in this paper, we hypothesize that two hotels in the same location are generally substitutes. 6
A burgeoning computer science literature has attempted to empirically examine the issue of fakery by creating textual analysis algorithms to detect fakery. However, since the entire goal of 5 Similarly, in 2009 in New York, the cosmetic surgery company Lifestyle Lift agreed to pay $300,000 to settle claims regarding fake online reviews about itself. In addition, a web site called verr.com which hosts posts by users advertising services for $5 (e.g.: I will drop o your dry-cleaning for $5 ) hosts a number of ads by people oering to write positive or negative hotel reviews for $5.
6 In theory, a similar logic applies to the potential for biased reviews of complementary products (although this possibility has not, to our knowledge, been discussed in the literature). For example, the owner of a breakfast restaurant located next door to a hotel might gain from posting a disingenuous positive review of the hotel. a fake reviewer is to mimic a real reviewer, identifying textual markers of fakery is dicult. For example, the popular press has widely cited the methodology described in Ott et al. (2011) in identifying fake reviews. The researchers hired individuals on the Amazon Mechanical Turk site to write persuasive fake hotel reviews. They then analyzed the dierences between the fake 5star reviews and truthful 5-star reviews on Tripadvisor to calibrate their psycholinguistic analysis.
However, it is possible that the markers of fakery that the researchers identify are not representative of dierently-authored fake reviews. For example, the authors nd that truthful reviews are more specic about spatial congurations than are the fake reviews. However, the authors specically hired fakers who had not visited the hotel. We can not, of course, infer from this nding that fake reviews on Tripadvisor authored by a hotel employee would in fact be less specic about spatial congurations than true reviews. Since we are concerned with fake reviewers with an economic incentive to mimic truthful reviewers, we are skeptical that textual analysis can provide durable mechanisms for detecting fake reviews.
7 Some other examples of papers that use textual analysis to determine review fakery are Jindal and Liu (2007) , Hu et al. (2012) , and Mukherjee and Glance (2012).
Kornish (2009) uses a dierent approach to detect review manipulation. She looks for evidence of double voting in user reviews. That is, one strategy for review manipulation is to post a fake positive review for one's product and to vote this review as helpful. That is, Kornish (2009) uses a correlation between review sentiment and usefulness votes as an indicator of manipulation.
This approach is vulnerable to the critique that there may be other (innocent) reasons for such correlation, such as conrmatory bias: if most people who visit a product's page are positively inclined towards the product, more positive reviews will be marked as useful since these reviews conrm the initial belief.
Previous literature has not examined the extent to which the design of websites that publish consumer reviews can discourage or encourage manipulation. In this paper, we exploit those dierences in design by examining Expedia versus Tripadvisor. The literature also has not empirically tested whether manipulation is more pronounced in empirical settings where it will be more benecial to the producer. Using data on organizational form, quality, and competition, we examine the relationship between online manipulation and market factors which may increase or decrease the incentive to engage in online manipulation. We will detail our methodology below; however, it is 7 One can think of the issue here as being similar to the familiar arms race between spammers and spam lters.
important to understand that our methodology does not rely on identifying any particular review as unbiased (real) or promotional (fake).
Of course, for review manipulation to make economic sense, online reviews must play a role in consumer decision-making. Substantial previous research establishes that online reviews aect consumer purchase behavior (see, for example, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) and Luca (2012) ).
There is less evidence specic to the travel context. Vermeulen and Seegers (2009) measure the impact of online hotel reviews on consumer decision-making in an experimental setting with 168 subjects. They show that online reviews increase consumer awareness of lesser-known hotels and positive reviews improve attitudes towards hotels. Similarly, Ye et al. (2010) use data from a major online travel agency in China to demonstrate a correlation between traveler reviews and online sales.
Data
User generated internet content has been particularly important in the travel sector. In particular,
TripAdvisor-branded websites have more than 50 million unique monthly visitors and contain over 60 million reviews. While our study uses the US site, TripAdvisor branded sites operate in 30 countries.
As Scott and Orlikowski (2012) Our data derive from multiple sources. First, we identied the 25th to 75th largest US cities (by population) to include in our sample. Our goal was to use cities that were large enough to t many hotels, but not so large and dense that competition patterns among the hotels would be dicult to determine. 8 In October of 2011, we scraped data on all hotels in these cities from Tripadvisor and Expedia. Some hotels are not listed on both sites, and some hotels do not have reviews on one of the sites (typically, Expedia). At each site, we obtained the text and star values of all user reviews, the identity of the reviewer (as displayed by the site), and the date of the review. We also obtained data from Smith Travel Research, a market research rm that provides data to the hotel industry (www.str.com). To match the data from STR to our Expedia and Tripadvisor data, we use name and address matching. Our data consist of 3082 hotels matched between Tripadvisor, Expedia, and STR. Our biggest hotel city is Atlanta with 160 properties, and our smallest is Toledo, with 10 8 We dropped Las Vegas, as these hotels tend to have an extremely large number of reviews at both sites relative to hotels in other cities; these reviews are often focused on the characteristics of the casino rather than the hotel.
Many reviewers may legitimately, then, have views about a characteristic of the hotel without ever having stayed at the hotel.
properties. Of the 3082 hotels matched across sites, 2931 have reviews on both sites. Table 1 provides summary statistics for review characteristics, using hotels as the unit of observation, for the set of hotels that have reviews on both sites. Unsurprisingly, given the lack of posting restrictions, there are more reviews on Tripadvisor than on Expedia. On average, our hotels have nearly three times the number of reviews on Tripadvisor as on Expedia. Also, the summary statistics reveal that on average, Tripadvisor reviewers are more critical than Expedia reviews. The average Tripadvisor star rating is 3.50 versus 3.95 for Expedia. Based on these summary statis-
tics, it appears that hotel reviewers are more critical than reviewers in other previously studied contexts. For example, numerous studies document that eBay feedback is overwhelmingly positive.
Similarly, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) report average reviews of 4.14 out of 5 at Amazon and 4.45 at barnesandnoble.com for a sample of 2387 books.
Review characteristics are similar if we use reviews, rather than hotels as the unit of observation.
Our data set consists of 350,430 TripAdvisor reviews and 123,569 Expedia reviews. Of all reviews, 8.0% of TripAdvisor reviews are 1s, 8.4% are 2s, and 38.1% are 5s. For Expedia, 4.7% of all review are 1s, 6.4% are 2s, and 48.5% of all reviews are 5s. Note that these numbers dier from the numbers in the table because hotels with more reviews tend to have better reviews. Thus, the average share of all reviews that are 1s or 2s is lower than the mean share of 1 star reviews or 2 star reviews for hotels. Since the model review on Tripadvisor is a 4-star review, in most of our analyses we consider negative reviews to be 1 or 2 star reviews.
We use the STR categorizations to identify the hotel category (economy, midscale, uppermidscale, upscale, upper upscale and luxury), and we use data from STR on the year that the hotel property was built to construct the hotel age. We also use STR to obtain the hotel location;
we assign each hotel a latitude and longitude designator and use these to calculate distances between hotels of various types. STR also classies each hotel location as urban, suburban, or resort, characteristics that we use as control variables in our regressions.
Most importantly, we use STR data to construct the various measures of organizational form that we use for each hotel in the data set. A hotel can be an independent, a franchised unit of a chain, or a company-owned unit of a chain. In general, franchising is the primary organizational form for the largest hotel chains in the US. For example, International Hotel Group (Holiday Inn) and Choice
Hotels are made up of more than 99% franchised units. Within the broad category of franchised units, there is a wide variety of organizational forms. STR provides us with information about each hotel's owner. The hotel owner (franchisee) can be an individual owner-operator or a large company.
For example, Archon Hospitality owns 41 hotels in our focus cities. In Memphis, Archon owns two Hampton Inns (an economy brand of Hilton), a Hyatt, and a Faireld Inn (an economy brand of Marriott). Typically, the individual hotel owner (franchisee) is the residual claimant for the hotel's prots, although the franchise contract generally requires the owner to pay a share of revenues to the parent brand. Owners often, though not always, subcontract day to day management of the hotel to a management company. Typically, the management company charges 3 to 5 percent of revenue, although agreements which involve some sharing of gross operating prots have become more common in recent years. 9 In some cases, the parent brand operates a management company.
For example, Marriott provides management services for approximately half of the hotels not owned by Marriott but operated under the Marriott nameplate. Like owners, management companies can manage multiple hotels under dierent nameplates. For example, Crossroads Hospitality manages 29 properties in our data set. In Atlanta, they manage a Hyatt, a Residence Inn (Marriott's longer term stay-focused brand), a Doubletree, and a Hampton Inn (both Hilton brands). While a consumer can clearly observe whether a hotel is a member of a branded chain, the ownership and management structure of the hotel are more dicult to infer for the consumer.
In constructing variables, we focus both on the characteristics of the hotel and characteristics of the hotel's neighbors. Table 2 provides summary measures of the hotel's own characteristics.
First, we construct a dummy for whether the hotel is an independent or part of a branded chain, using the characterizations reported in STR: 17% of hotels in our sample are independent. The top 5 parent companies of branded chain hotels in our sample are: Marriott, Hilton, Choice Hotels, Intercontinental, and Best Western. Second, we construct a dummy for whether the hotel is owned by a multi-unit ownership entity identied by STR. For example, non-independent hotels that are not owned by a franchisee but owned by the parent chain will be characterized as owned by a multi-unit ownership entity, but so will hotels that are owned by a large multi-unit franchisee.
Furthermore, while independent hotels do not have a parent brand, they are in some cases operated by large multi-unit owners. In our sample, 16% of independent hotels and 34% of branded chain hotels are owned by a multi-unit owners. Thus, the modal hotel is a chain member, but operated by a small owner. Third, for some specications, we will also examine hotels operated by large multi-unit management companies, which is the case for 35% of independent hotels and for 55% of 9 See O'Fallon and Rutherford (2010). We then characterize the neighbors of the hotels in our data. The summary statistics for these measures are in Table 3 . That is, for each hotel in our data, we rst construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one if that hotel has a neighbor hotel within 0.5km. As the summary statistics show, 76% of the hotels in our data have a neighbor. We next construct a dummy that takes the value of one if a hotel has a neighbor hotel that is an independent. Obviously, this set of ones is a subset of the previous measure; 31% of all of the hotels in our data have an independent neighbor.
We also construct a dummy for whether the hotel has a neighbor that is owned by a multi-unit owner. In our data 49% of the hotels have a neighbor owned by a multi-unit owner company. For some specications, we also examine the management structure of neighbor hotels. We construct a variable that takes the value of one if a hotel has a neighbor hotel operated by a multi-unit management entity, which is the case for 59% of hotels in our sample. Using the data on hotel quality tiers described earlier, we also examine hotel competition among hotels in the same quality tier. For 48% of the hotels in our data, there exists at least one neighbor in the same quality tier. Mayzlin (2006) , Dellarocas (2006) ) models review generation as a mixture of unbiased reviews and reviews surreptitiously generated by competing rms. The consumer, upon seeing a review, must discount the information taking into account the equilibrium level of review manipulation.
In the Appendix we present a simple model that is closely related to the previous models of promotional reviews but also incorporates a few new key elements that are present in the current context: 1) we allow the cost of review manipulation to dier across rms, and 2) we consider the case where the consumer does not observe the rm's cost of manipulation. This model yields two intuitive results. First, as is the case in the previous literature, an increase in the rm's cost of review manipulation decreases the amount of manipulation in equilibrium. Note that this also implies that if the rm's competitor has lower cost of review manipulation, the rm will have more negative manufactured reviews. Second, if the consumer does not observe the rms' costs of review manipulation, she under-estimates the amount of manipulation for the low-cost type rm and overestimates the amount of manipulation for the high-cost type. In this sense, fake reviewing aects consumer choice in equilibrium.
In practice, the primary cost of promotional reviews from the rm's perspective is the risk that the activity will be publicly exposed. The penalties that an exposed rm faces range from government nes, possibility of lawsuits, and penalties imposed by the review-hosting platform. We use the literature on reputational incentives and organizational form to argue that this cost is also aected by the size of the entity. In this regard, our analysis is related to Blair and Lafontaine (2005) and Jin and Leslie (2012) who examine the incentive eects of reputational spillovers among co-branded entities. However, we exploit the rich dierences in organizational form (chain vs independent, large owner versus small owner, and large management company vs small management company) particular to the hotel industry.
Note that reviews on travel review sites are hotel-specic, rather than chain or owner specic.
That is, a Hampton Inn in Cambridge, MA has unique reviews, distinct from the reviews of a Hampton Inn in Atlanta, Georgia. If one wants to enhance the reputation of both hotels, one must post reviews of both hotels separately on the site. In our model, each incremental promotional review posted increases the probability of getting caught. However, larger entities recognize the potential for negative spillovers resulting from being caught undertaking fraudulent activities. Specically, if an employee of a multi-unit entity gets caught posting or soliciting fake reviews, any resulting government action, lawsuit, or retribution by the review site will implicate the entire organization.
For example, the Irish hotel Clare Inn Hotel and Suites, part of the Lynch Hotel Group, was given the red badge by Tripadvisor warning customers that the hotel manipulated reviews after it was uncovered that a hotel executive solicited positive reviews. Trip Advisor also removed reviews from other Lynch Hotel Group Hotels, and the treatment of Lynch hotel group was covered by news media in Ireland.
10 Because of this spillover, many entities have social media policies, constraining the social media practices of employees.
11 Thus, the key assumption underlying our ownership specication is that the reputational benet of posting a fake review only accrues to one hotel, while the cost of posting the fake review (getting caught) multiply in the number of hotels in the entity. Thus smaller entities have a bigger incentive to post fake reviews. In terms of our model, the larger entity bears a higher δ and γ, and hence will fake fewer reviews in equilibrium based on Proposition 1.
In our paper, we consider the dierential incentives of multi-unit entities using three measures of entity type. First, we consider independent hotels versus hotels operating under a common 10 http://www.independent.ie/national-news/hotel-told-sta-to-fake-reviews-on- nameplate. Second, we consider ownership entities that are large multi-unit owners versus small owners. Third, we consider management by a large management company versus management by a smaller entity. In each case, a review posted by the entity will benet only one unit in the entity while the cost of being caught can conceivably spill over to the entire entity. We address one possible caveat to this methodology. This caveat arises in the case of chain-aliated hotel posting positive fake reviews about itself. It seems conceivable that there could be positive reputational spillovers between hotels in a chain. That is, an improved customer review at one Hampton Inn, for example, could benet another Hampton Inn. However, this seems unlikely since TripAdvisor and Expedia are set up to review individual hotels. Furthermore, this concern does not arise for the ownership variable; while chain aliation is visible to consumers, co-ownership is not. Thus, it seems inconceivable that a positive review for, say, Archon Hospitality's Memphis Faireld Inn would improve the reputation of its Hampton Inn. This concern is also less likely to arise in the case of negative competitor reviews. Posting a negative review of one hotel will likely only benet that hotel's neighbors, not other hotels throughout the chain.
In summary, we argue that the ownership structure of the rm aects the costs of the promotional reviewing activity, which in turn aects the equilibrium level of manufactured reviews. Specically, based on our simple model and the discussion above, we make the following three theoretical claims:
1. A rm that is a smaller entity will create more fake reviews.
2. A rm that is located close to a competitor will have more fake negative reviews than a rm with no close neighbors.
3. A rm that is located close to a smaller entity competitor will have more fake negative reviews.
Methodology and Results
As Section 3 describes, we collect reviews from two sites, Tripadvisor and Expedia. There is a key dierence between these two sites which we utilize in order to help us identify the presence of review manipulation: while anybody can post a review on Tripadvisor, only those users who purchased the hotel stay on Expedia in the past six months can post a review for the hotel. 12 This 12 Before a user posts a review on Tripadvisor, she has to click on a box that certies that she has no personal or business aliation with this establishment, and have not been oered any incentive or payment originating the establishment to write this review. In contrast, before a user posts a review on Expedia, she must log in to the site, and Expedia veries that the user actually purchased the hotel within the required time period.
implies that it is far less costly for a hotel to post fake reviews on Tripadvisor versus posting fake reviews on Expedia; we expect that there would be far more review manipulation on Tripadvisor than on Expedia. In other words, a comparison of the dierence in the distribution of reviews for the same hotel could potentially help us identify the presence of review manipulation. However, we
can not infer promotional activity from a straightforward comparison of reviews for hotels overall on Tripadvisor and Expedia since the population of reviewers using Tripadvisor and Expedia may dier; the websites dier in characteristics other than reviewer identity verication.
Here we take a dierences in dierences approach (although, unconventionally, neither of our dierences are in the time dimension): for each hotel, we examine the dierence in review distribution across Expedia and Tripadvisor and across dierent competitive/ownership conditions. We use the claims of Section 4 to argue that the incentives to post fake reviews will dier across dierent competitive/ownership conditions. That is, we hypothesize that hotels with greater incentive to manipulate reviews will post more fake positive reviews for themselves and more fake negative reviews for their hotel neighbors on Tripadvisor, and we expect to see these eects in the dierence in the distributions of reviews on Tripadvisor and Expedia.
Consider the estimating equation:
This specication estimates correlates of the dierence between the share of reviews on TA that are N star and the share of reviews on Expedia that are N star for hotel i in city j. Our primary interest will be in the most extreme reviews, 1-star/2-star and 5-star. X ij contains controls for hotel characteristics; these hotel characteristics should only matter to the extent that Tripadvisor We start by examining the eects of own-hotel organizational and ownership characteristics (Own ij ) on the incentive to manipulate reviews. Following the discussion in Section 4, we hypothesize that an entity that is associated with more properties has more to lose from being caught manipulating reviews: the negative reputational spillovers are higher. Hence, we claim that 1) independent hotels have a higher incentive to post fake positive reviews (have a higher share of 5-star reviews on Tripadvisor versus Expedia) than branded chain hotels, 2) small owners have a higher incentive to post fake positive reviews than multi-unit owner hotels, 3) hotels with a small management company have a higher incentive to post fake positive reviews than hotels that use multi-unit management company. Finally, an alternative explanation for independent hotels having a higher share of positive reviews on Tripadvisor is that the Tripadvisor population likes independent hotels more than the Expedia population. While we can not rule out this alternative explanation, the same critique does not apply to the small owner variables since the ownership structure is not easily observable by customers or reviewers. That is, since neither the identity of the ownership entity (e.g.: Archon Hospitality) nor how many units it owns is observable to the reviewers, it is unlikely that reviewers on the dierent sites would exhibit dierent preferences for hotels that are owned by multi-unit entities versus single-unit entities. Similarly, we can argue that the size of the management company should not aect the relative preference for the hotel across the two sites.
Finally, we turn to the eect of N eighOwn ij variables on review manipulation. Following claim 2 in Section 4, we hypothesize that a hotel with at least one neighbor will have more fake negative reviews (have a higher share of 1-star/2-star reviews on Tripadvisor than on Expedia) than a hotel with no neighbor. In addition, using claim 3 from Section 4, we hypothesize that the neighbor eect will be exacerbated when the rm has an independent neighbor, and that the neighbor eect will be mitigated when the rm has a multi-unit owner or multi-unit management company neighbor.
Note that our empirical methodology is similar to the approach undertaken in the economics literature on cheating. The most closely related papers in that stream are Duggan and Levitt (2002) , Jacob and Levitt (2003) , and Dellavigna and Ferrara (2010) . In all three papers the authors do not observe rule-breaking or cheating (throwing sumo wrestling matches, teachers cheating on student achievement tests, or companies trading arms in embargoed countries) directly. Instead, the authors infer that rule-breaking occurs indirectly. That is, Duggan and Levitt (2002) document a consistent pattern of outcomes in matches that are important for one of the players, Jacob and Levitt (2003) infer cheating from consistent patterns test answers, and Dellavigna and Ferrara (2010) infer arms embargo violations if weapon-making companies' stocks react to changes in conict intensity. In all of these papers we see that cheaters respond to incentives. Importantly for our paper, Dellavigna and Ferrara (2010) show that a decrease in reputation costs of illegal trades results in more illegal trading. Our empirical methodology is similar to this previous work. First, we also do not observe review manipulation directly and must infer it from patterns in the data. Second, we hypothesize and show that the rate of manipulation is aected by dierences in reputation costs for players in dierent conditions. The innovation in our work is that by using two dierent platforms with dramatically dierent costs of cheating we are able to have a benchmark.
Main Results
In this Section we present the estimation results of the basic dierences in dierences approach to identify review manipulation. Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of Equation (1).
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used throughout. We rst turn to the specication where the dependent variable is the dierence in the share of 5-star reviews. That is, the dependent variable is
. This is our measure of possible positive review manipulation. Consistent with our hypothesis that independent hotels optimally post more positive fake reviews, we see that independent hotels have 2.7 percentage points higher dierence in the share of 5-star reviews across the two sites than branded chain hotels. Since hotels on Tripadvisor have on average a 31% share of 5-star reviews, the magnitude of the eect is large. As we mentioned before, while this result is consistent with manipulation, we can not rule out the possibility that reviewers on Tripadvisor tend to prefer independent hotels over branded chain hotels to a bigger extent than Expedia customers.
It is more dicult to believe that there is a strong disparity across sites in preferences for hotels with multi-unit owners, a hotel characteristic that is virtually unobservable to the consumer.
Consistent with our hypothesis that multi-unit owners will nd review manipulation more costly, and therefore engage in less review manipulation, we nd that hotels that are owned by a multi-unit owner have a 3.1 percentage point smaller dierence in the share of 5-star reviews across the two sites. This translates to about four fewer 5-star reviews on Tripadvisor if we assume that the share of Expedia reviews stays the same across these two conditions and that the hotel has a total of 120 reviews on Tripadvisor, the site average. While we include neighbor eects in this specication, we do not have strong hypotheses on the eect of neighbor characteristics on the dierence in the share of 5-star reviews across the two sites, since there is no apparent incentive for a neighboring hotel to practice positive manipulation on the focal hotel. Indeed, in the 5-star specication, none of the estimated neighbor eects are signicant.
We next consider to the specication where the dependent variable is the dierence in the share of 1 and 2-star reviews. Our dependent variable is thus
This is our measure of negative review manipulation. Unlike the previous specication, here we do not expect to see any eects of the hotel's organizational structure on its own share of 1 and 2-star reviews since a hotel is not expected to negatively manipulate its own ratings. Instead, our hypotheses concern the eects of the presence of neighbor hotels on negative review manipulation.
The results are in Column 2 of Table 4 . Our coecient estimates suggest that the presence of any neighbor within 0.5km signicantly increases the dierence in the 1 and 2-star share across the two sites. The presence of an independent hotel within 0.5km results in an additional increase of 1.7 percentage point in the dierence in the share of 1 and 2-star reviews across the two sites. Our point estimates imply that having an independent neighbor versus having no neighbor results in a 4.5 percentage point increase in and 1 and 2 star reviews (2.8 percentage points for having any neighbor plus 1.7 for the neighbor being independent). These are large estimated eects given that the average share of 1 and 2-star reviews is 25% for a hotel on Tripadvisor. Again, we hypothesize that multi-unit owners bear a higher cost of review manipulation and thus will engage in less review manipulation. Our results show that the presence of a multi-unit owner hotel within 0.5km results in 2.5 percentage point decrease in the dierence in the share of 1 and 2-star reviews across the two sites, relative to having only single-unit owner neighbors.
What do the results in Table 4 suggest about the extent of manipulation of reviews overall on an open platform such as Tripadvisor? As we discuss above, the amount of manipulation depends on the exact hotel characteristics. As an example, let's consider the dierence in positive manipulation under two extreme cases: a) a branded chain hotel that is owned by a multi-unit owner (the case with the lowest predicted and estimated amount of manipulation) and b) an independent hotel that is owned by a small owner (the case with the greatest predicted and estimated amount of Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius. manipulation). Our estimates suggest that, assuming the Tripadvisor average of 120 total reviews, we would expect about 7 more positive reviews in case b versus case a. Similarly, we can perform a comparison for the case of negative manipulation by neighbors. Consider case c) being a completely isolated hotel and case d) being located near an independent hotel that is owned by a small owner.
Our estimates suggest that there would be a total of 5 more fake negative reviews in case d versus case c.
While it appears that the total amount of negative manipulation is lower than the amount of positive manipulation, it is useful to note that, given the overall average star rankings on Tripadvisor is above 3 (and the modal review is 4), an incremental 1 or 2-star review will change the average stars more than an incremental 5 star reviews. Unfortunately, it is impossible for us, given these data,
to measure the eect that these ratings changes will have on sales. While Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) show that 1 star reviews hurt book sales more than 5 star reviews help book sales, those ndings do not necessarily apply to this context. Chevalier and Mayzlin note that two competing books on the same subject may indeed be net complements, rather than net substitutes. Authors and publishers, then, may gain from posting fake positive reviews of their own books, but will not necessarily benet from posting negative reviews of rivals books. Thus, in the context of books, 1 star reviews may be more credible than 5 star reviews. We have seen that, in the case of hotels, where two hotels proximate to each other are clearly substitutes, one cannot infer that a 1 or 2 star review should be treated by customers as more credible than a 5 star review.
Finally, note that while it appears that the total amount of manipulation is economically significant in that we would expect it to distort choices, the amount of manipulation is small enough so that it should not destroy the informational value of Tripadvisor reviews. That is, we can speculate that while rms engage in review manipulation, and this sometimes distorts consumer choices, consumers still nd reviews informative and persuasive. This is of course consistent with the observed popularity of Tripadvisor.
Our preceding analysis is predicated on the hypothesis that promotional reviewers have an incentive to imitate real reviewers as completely as possible. This is in contrast to the computer science literature, described above, that attempts to nd textual markers of fake reviews. Nonetheless, for robustness, we do separately examine one category of suspicious reviews. These are reviews that are posted by one-time contributors to Tripadvisor. The least expensive way for a hotel to generate a user review is to create a ctitious prole on Tripadvisor (which only requires an email address), and following the creation of this prole, to post a review. This is, of course, not the only way that the hotel can create reviews. Another option is for a hotel to pay a user with an existing review history to post a fake review; yet another possibility is to create a review history in order to camouage a fake review. Here, we examine suspicious reviews the review for a hotel is the rst and only review that the user ever posted. In our sample, 23% of all Tripadvisor reviews are posted by one-time reviewers. These reviews are more likely to be extreme (on the positive end) compared to the entire Tripadvisor sample: 48% of one-time reviewers are 5-star versus 31% in the entire Tripadvisor sample. Interestingly, the distributions on the negative end are similar: 24% of one-time reviews are 1 and 2-star versus 25% in the entire Tripadvisor sample. Of course, the extremeness of one-time reviews does not in and of itself suggest that one-time reviews are more likely to be fake; users who otherwise do not make a habit of reviewing may be moved to do so by an unusual experience with a hotel.
In Table 5 we present the results of the following three specications. In the rst column, we present the results of a specication where the dependent variable is the share of one-time contributor user reviews on Tripadvisor. Thus, our dependent variable is one−time Reviews T A ij T otal Reviews T A ij . This captures the incidence of these suspicious reviews and includes potential positive as well as negative manipulation. The most striking result is that one-time reviews are 9 percentage points more common for independent hotels. This is consistent with our earlier results, but also could be attributable to legitimate customer reviewing preferences. Also consistent with our earlier results, we nd a negative impact of mult-unit owner on one-time reviewing activity, and a negative impact of multi-unit owner neighbors. There is one variable in our specication that does not have the anticipated sign. The presence of any neighbor is negatively associated with suspicious reviews (although this eect is insignicant); our model would predict that this association would be positive.
The other two specications in Table 5 address the valence of these reviews. For these specications, the dependent variable is
. That is, we look at the dierence between the share of N -star suspicious reviews on TripAdvisor and the overall share of N-Star reviews on Expedia. Column 2 shows the case where N = 5. The eect of hotel independence is positive, as predicted, but not signicantly dierent from zero. Multi-unit owner has a statistically signicant 2.3 percentage point lower dierence in the share of 5-star reviews across the two sites, which is consistent with our hypotheses and earlier results. The neighbor eects are not statistically signicant, as they weren't in the specications that used all TA 5-star reviews.
Column 3 shows the case where N = 1 + 2. Here, we nd that the presence of a neighbor increases the dierence in the share of 1 and 2-star reviews across the two sites by a statistically signicant 3 percentage points. As in our previous specications, having an independent neighbor exacerbates the neighbor eect while having a multi-unit owner neighbor mitigates it. These eects are not, however, statistically signicant at standard condence levels. Overall, these results conrm our prior results that manipulation of reviews takes place in a way that is consistent with predicted hotel incentives. However, our results for suspicious reviews are not as compelling as our results for all reviews. Of course, with this analysis we are forced to focus on a smaller subset of reviews, which may be noisy. Further, if fakers are sophisticated in their attempt to avoid detection, they may be avoiding these suspicious reviewing activities.
Robustness Checks
In this Section, we undertake a number of further checks that the results are robust to a variety of reasonable specications. First, we consider additional variables concerning hotel structure.
Specically, we include a variable that equals one if the hotel is managed by a multi-unit management company. As we explain in Section 3, the management company is not residual claimant to hotel protability the way that the owner is, but nonetheless, obviously has a stake in hotel success. Thus, we expect that a multi-unit management company would have a lower incentive to post fake reviews than a single-unit manager (which in many cases is the owner). We also include the neighbor analog of this variable, a variable that takes the value of one if the hotel has a neighbor that is managed by a multi-unit management company.
In the rst column in Table 6 , we use the share dierence in 5 star reviews as the dependent variable. We see that indeed a hotel that is managed by a multi-unit management company has a statistically signicant 2 percentage point decrease in the dierence of the share of 5-star reviews between the two sites which we interpret as a decrease in positive manipulation. Notably, the inclusion of this variable does not alter our previous results; independent hotels continue to have signicantly more 5-star reviews on Tripadvisor relative to Expedia and hotels with multi-unit owners have fewer 5-star reviews. There are, as before, no signicant neighbor eects for 5-star reviews. Column 1 of Table 7 repeats this same specication for 1 and 2-star reviews. Here, as before, we have no predictions for the own hotel characteristics (and none are statistically dierent from zero). We do have predictions for neighbor characteristics. As before, we nd that having any Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius.
neighbor is associated with having more 1 and 2 star reviews, a 3.6 percentage point increase. As before, an independent hotel neighbor predicts more negative reviews and having a large owner chain neighbor predicts fewer negative reviews. The presence of a large management company neighbor is a negative predictor of negative reviews, although the eect is not statistically signicant at standard condence level. The presence of a large owner neighbor and the presence of a large management company neighbor are quite positively correlated. A test of the joint signicance shows that the two variables are jointly signicant in our specication at the 1 percent level. Thus, altogether, there is suggestive evidence that, like larger owner companies, larger management companies are associated with less review manipulation.
In the second column in Table 6 and Table 7 , we present specications that include a new neighbor variable: a dummy that is one if a hotel has a neighbor in the same narrow quality tier.
Recall that STR provides data on hotel quality tiers: Luxury, Upper Upscale, Upscale, Upper
Midscale, Midscale, and Economy. If competition between hotels within the same quality tier is more intense, the presence of a neighbor in the same quality tier might provide additional incentive to fake reviews. In Table 7 , the coecient for the neighbor indicator variable remains positive, and the same tier neighbor indicator has an incremental positive coecient as anticipated, but it is not signicant.
In the third column of Table 6 and Table 7 , we present 5-star and 1 and 2-star specications that also include hotel chain xed eects for the ten largest hotel brands. Inclusion of these chain xed eects allows Tripadvisor and Expedia patrons to have a very general form of dierent preferences.
They can have not only dierent preferences for hotel quality tiers and hotel age (all included in the controls in our base specications), but also can have dierent preferences for dierent individual hotel brands. These specications produce results very similar to the base specications discussed in Table 5 . The only change that inclusion of this variable causes compared to the earlier results is that the independent own hotel dummy in the 5-star specication is no longer statistically signicant.
Throughout, we have used 1 and 2 star reviews as our marker of negative reviews. We chose this specication in part due to the summary statistics outlined in Table 1 . While 31% of reviews on Tripadvisor are 5s, 1s and 2s together only account for 25% of reviews. Hence, a rm attempting to denigrate its competitor will often be able to do so eectively with either 1 or 2 star promotional reviews. Nonetheless, we provide robustness results where we examine the basic specication in Equation 1 above, but consider only determinants of 1 star reviews. This is shown in the fourth Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius. Orbitz allowed others to submit hotel reviews, but reviews from veried customers are identied as Veried and are given higher weight in calculating the Orbitz Reviewer Score for each property. In our robustness results, we use only veried reviews from Orbitz. Thus, these reviews are analogous to Expedia reviews. (For our hotels, we have a total of 87716 veried Orbitz reviews and only 692 unveried reviews.) Summary statistics are shown in Table 8 . Orbitz is less attractive to us as a review site than Expedia. There are 104 hotels that have reviews at Tripadvisor and Expedia but no reviews at Orbitz. For hotels with reviews at both Orbitz and Tripadvisor, the hotels have only about three-quarters the number of Orbitz reviews as Expedia for the hotels in our sample.
However, if our results are driven by important (and subtle) dierences between the customer pools at Expedia and Tripadvisor, robustness of our results for Orbitz may be valuable. Table 9 repeats the regression specications of Table 4 , replacing Orbitz veried reviews with Expedia reviews. Regressions results aresimilar to the results found in Table 4 . As in Table 4 , we nd that independent hotels have more 5 star reviews on Tripadvisor versus Orbitz, and hotels from large ownership entities have fewer 5 star reviews. In the Orbitz specication, the magnitude of the independence eect is somewhat larger than in our Expedia specications, while the magnitude and signicance of the multi-unit owner eect is smaller. Turning to the 1 and 2-star reviews, we nd, as in Table 4 , the own hotel owner characteristics are small and insignicant. However, we also nd small and insignicant hotel neighbor eects. Also, as shown in the third column of Table 9 , in contrast to our Expedia results, we nd somewhat dierent results when we isolate 1 star reviews from 1 and 2-star reviews. Here, we nd that all of the neighbor characteristics have the expected signs, are similar in magnitude to the results in Table 4 , but are not statistically signicant at standard condence levels. Overall, we take these results as suggestive that many of our our ndings our robust when examining alternative sites; however, given the smaller number of reviews on Orbitz, we cannot determine this conclusively.
Conclusion and Limitations
We propose a novel methodology for empirically detecting review manipulation. In particular, we examine the dierence in review distribution across Expedia and Tripadvisor, sites with dierent reviewer identity verication policies, and across dierent competitive/ownership conditions. Consistent with our theoretical claims, we nd that an increase in hotel incentives to manipulate reviews results in an increase in our measures of manipulation. Substantively, we nd that independent hotels engage in more review manipulation (both positive and negative), while hotels with multi-unit owners as well as hotels that are managed by a multi-unit management companies engage in less review manipulation (in the former case we nd the eect for positive and negative manipulation, while in the latter we nd the eect only in the case of positive manipulation). One important strength of our proposed methodology compared to earlier attempts is that our method does not require us to identify any particular review as fake or real, an inherently noisy and dicult task.
Instead, we conne ourselves to examining dierences between distributions.
We nd that while the amount of review manipulation is economically signicant, it is still small relatively to the total amount of reviewing activity. Why don't hotels engage in more intense review manipulation, given the fact that the mechanical costs of faking a review are low? Aside from any ethical concerns that the hotels have in engaging in this activity, we hypothesize that engaging in this activity exposes rms to reputational risks. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5 km radius. the reviews to its own customers. The downside is the degrading eect of review manipulation on the informational value of the site. Our empirical results show that the hotels are essentially able to self-police so that while they engage in some manipulation, the amount is not big enough to overwhelm the informational value of the site.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on incentives and organizational form. Our unusually rich data set allows us to exploit the fact that ownership patterns in the hotel industry are actually quite complicated. For example, as discussed previously, a hotel can be franchised to a quite large franchisee company; that franchisee company is less incentivized to engage in fraudulent activity than a small franchisee. In our paper, we advance the literature on ownership by utilizing data on these complex ownership structures.
There are a number of limitations of this work. Perhaps the biggest limitation is that we do not observe manipulation directly but must infer it. This issue is of course inherent in doing research in this area. In the paper we deal with this limitation by building a strong case that the eects that we examine are due to review manipulation and not due to other unobserved factors. The second important limitation is that our measure of review manipulation does not include any content analysis. That is, one could imagine that one way in which a hotel could increase the impact of a fake review is by making particularly strong claims in the text of the review. For example, to hurt a competitor, a competitor could claim to be a traveler who witnessed a bed bug infestation. This is an interesting issue for future work.
Another limitation of this work is that we are unable to measure the impact that this manipulation has on consumer purchase behavior. Do consumers somehow detect and discount fake reviews? Do they discount all reviews to some extent? Do they make poor choices on the basis of fake reviews? These questions are also left for future work. 7 Appendix
A Simple Model
We propose a very simple and stylized model to x ideas. The game consists of two competing rms, A and B, and a continuum of consumers. The time line of the game is the following:
1. Stage I : Nature draws the true quality of each rm (q A and q B ). We assume that the rms' true quality is not observable to any of the game's players.
13 The prior belief on the rm qualities are: q A ∼ N ormal(q 0 , σ 2 q ) and q B ∼ N ormal(q 0 , σ 2 q ). Here, the two rms a priori are identically distributed, but the model can be easily generalized to the case where the prior means are not equal. Unless otherwise noted, we assume that all other parameters of the model are common knowledge.
2. Stage II : The rms set prices (p A and p B ), which are observed by all the players.
3. Stage III : Each rm can surreptitiously (and simultaneously) manufacture positive reviews for itself and negative reviews for its competitor. The reviews are posted by a third party platform that does not verify the reviewers' identity. That is, consumers can not dierentiate between real and manufactured (or biased) user reviews. We denote by e i,i the eort that rm i invests into positive self-promotion (manufactured positive reviews), and by e i,j the eort that rm i invests into negative reviews for rm j. While the actual rms' eorts are not observed by the consumers, consumers do observe the user ratings for both rms. Hence we can think of the set of user ratings (which consists of real and fake reviews) providing a signal to the consumer on the rm's true quality. In particular, the signals arising from user ratings are the following:
That is, the signal generated from user reviews on rm A's quality consists of the true quality (q A ), the positive self-promotion eort by rm A (e A,A ), the negative eort by its competitor (e B,A ), as well as a noise term (ε A ) that reects random shocks experienced by unbiased 13 The case where only rms, but not the consumers, observe each other's true quality yields similar results, but is considerably more complicated.
reviews: ε i ∼ N ormal(0, σ 2 ε ). We also assume that the noise terms are independent across rms. 4. We model the manipulation eort as costly to the rm. We can think of this cost as the reputation-related risks associated with this kind of promotion. That is, if the rm is caught doing this kind of activity, it will suer damage to its reputation, where the damage may dier if the rm is caught doing self-promotion or generating negative review for its competitors.
The chance of getting caught is increasing (at an increasing rate) in the intensity of the promotional activity: the cost is convex in the manipulation eort. Hence we assume that
> 0, and
> 0. The following assumed simple functional form satises these conditions: C(e i,i , e i,j ) = δ 2 (e i,i ) 2 + γ 2 (e i,j ) 2 . Here δ signies the damage caused to the rm if it caught doing self-promotion, and γ the damage if it is posting negative reviews for its competitor.
5. Stage IV : Finally, the consumer chooses the product that maximizes her utility. We assume that the products are horizontally dierentiated. We use a simple Hotelling model of dierentiation to model consumer choice, where rm A is located at x = 0, rm B is located at x = 1, and the consumer at location x chooses A if
We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Since consumers do not observe the true quality directly, their expected utility from A and B is inferred from the signals generated from user reviews.
We next solve for the rms' optimal actions by backward induction. We start with the consumer's inference in stage 4. After observing the signal s A and s B , the consumers' posterior beliefs on the rms' qualities are:
where µ s = σ 2 q σ 2 ε +σ 2 q (0 < µ s < 1) is the optimal weight that the consumer puts on the rms' reviews, andê * A,A andê * B,A are the inferred equilibrium eort levels since the consumer does not observe the rms' manipulation activity directly.
Assuming market coverage, the consumer who is indierent between the two products is located at pointx, wherex
Hence, the market shares of rms A and B arex and 1 −x, respectively. This implies the following prot functions for rms A and B, respectively in stage 3:
Substituting (5) and (6) into (8) and (9), and taking the expectation, we can re-write the rms' maximization problem as the following: below presents the optimal manipulation levels for the rms: Proposition 1. In stage 3 (after the rms have committed to prices p A and p B ), the optimal promotional levels are the following: 
Proof. To solve for the optimal promotional levels, we 1) derive the rst order conditions of rm A's prot function by dierentiating Equation (10) The Corollary below summarizes several key results that we will use in our empirical analysis: Corollary 1. The following results are implied by Proposition 1:
1) A decrease in the reputational costs of manipulation increases the intensity of this activity: ∂γ B > 0. 2) Firms engage in negative manipulation of reviews of their competitors: e * A,B > 0 and e * B,A > 0, and this activity increases as the costs of manipulation decrease. Hence, a rm that is located close to a competitor will have more negative reviews than a rm has no close competitors (which will have no fake negative reviews), and the number of fake negative reviews is greater if the competitor has lower costs of manipulation.
Finally, we turn to the eect that review manipulation has on consumer choice. In the basic model consumer can invert the rm's problem and perfectly discounts the amount of manipulation.
That is, in equilibrium, e * A,A = e * A,A , e * A,B = e * A,B , e * B,B = e * B,B , and e * B,A = e * B,A . Since fake reviews are perfectly discounted, the consumer would make the same choices in the current setting where fake reviews are possible and in one where fake reviews are not possible. Despite the fact that fake reviews do not aect consumer choices in equilibrium, rms prefer to post reviews. That is, if the rm chooses not to engage in manipulation, the consumer who expects fake reviews will think that the rm is terrible.
While Corollary 1 is derived assuming exogenous prices, the comparative statics are qualitatively similar under endogenous prices, which are set in the second stage. As we argue above, the rm does not expect manipulation to change its market share in expectation, given the optimal discounting by the consumer. Hence, the maximization problem in the second stage is the following 
After the appropriate substitutions (Proposition 1 provides e * A,A , etc.), taking the rst order conditions, and some algebra, we have the following expressions for the equilibrium prices:
For simplicity, let's assume that δ A = γ A ≡ ρ and δ B = γ B ≡ 1. We can show that an increase in ρ (an increase in the reputational costs) results in less promotion on the part of the rm:
Next we consider a realistic extension of the model which changes the observability assumption.
That is, suppose that the consumer does not observe the costs of each rm but forms an expectation on the costs based on prior beliefs. We believe that this assumption is more realistic for our empirical setting. We can show that this results in an outcome where a rm with lower manipulation cost has a higher share and the rm with higher manipulation cost has a lower share compared to the case where review manipulation is not possible. That is, this Proposition shows that manipulation of reviews may create distortions in choices under imperfect observability.
Proposition 2. Assume for simplicity that δ = γ. Suppose that the consumer does not observe the rms' costs of manipulation. That is, with probability α the rm has high cost of manipulation: δ = δ H , and with probability 1 − α the rm has low cost of manipulation: δ = δ L . Consider the case where both types pool on price consumers can not infer the rm's cost of manipulation from the price. Here e * L,i,i = e * L,i,j = p A µs 2δ L t , e * H,i,i = e * H,i,j = p A µs 2δ H t , and e * i,i = e * i,j = 
The only dierence here is that the consumer's inference (ê * A,A ,ê * A,B , etc.) will be dierent since the consumers can not observe the rm's cost function. Taking the derivative with respect to the promotion levels, it is clear that the optimal promotion level does not depend on the consumer's inference. That is, as before,
The consumer's inference will be a weighted average of the two types' optimal promotion levels, as is given in Proposition 2.
Here the consumer under-estimates the amount of manipulation for low-cost type of rm and over-estimates the amount of manipulation for high-cost rm: e * L,i,i > e * i,i > e * H,i,i and e * L,i,j > e * i,j > e * H,i,j . This results in a higher share for low-cost rm and a lower share for high-cost rm compared to the case with no manipulation.
